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I. FINANCIAL LITERACY EDUCATION AS
FINANCIAL REGULATION
Families are losing their homes; during 2007, 2008, and 2009 alone,
economists anticipate at least 2.5 million completed foreclosures in the
United States.1 When it comes to health care, 42% of Americans are
uninsured or underinsured.2 Annual bankruptcy filings, the overwhelming
majority of which are consumer bankruptcies, march towards the one
million mark.3 Retirement savings are at pitiful levels; over a third of
workers have less than $10,000 in savings and nearly half have less than

1. In 2007, just over half a million foreclosures were completed. BILL LONGBRAKE,
HOPE NOW ALLIANCE SERVICERS, PRIME AND SUBPRIME RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGES:
2007 LOSS MITIGATION ACTIVITY 7 (2008), http://www.fsround.org/media/pdfs/National
dataFeb.pdf. In 2008 and 2009 collectively, economists expect at least two million more
completed foreclosures. JAMES LARDNER, DMOS, BEYOND THE MORTGAGE MELTDOWN:
ADDRESSING THE CURRENT CRISIS, AVOIDING A FUTURE CATASTROPHE 1 (2008), http://www.
demos.org/pubs/housingpaper.pdf (referring to estimates by economist Mark Zandi). To put
this in some perspective, 2.5 million households would cover the entire population, renter and
homeowner, of Massachusetts. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MASSACHUSETTS, FACT SHEET—
AMERICAN FACTFINDER (2005), http://factfinder.census.gov/ (in the “state” search bar, select
“Massachusetts” and then click “GO”). More recent projections have been more dire. See
R OD D UBITSKY ET AL ., C REDIT S UISSE , F ORECLOSURE U PDATE : O VER 8 M ILLION
FORECLOSURES EXPECTED 1 (2008), http://www.chapa.org/pdf/ForeclosureUpdateCreditSuisse.
pdf (projecting 8.1 million foreclosures over the next four years, meaning more than 16%
of homeowners with a mortgage will lose their homes to foreclosure).
2. Cathy Schoen et al., How Many Are Underinsured? Trends Among U.S.
Adults, 2003 and 2007, HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVE, June 10, 2008, at w300.
3. News Release, U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Filings Up in March (June 3, 2008),
http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/2008/BankruptcyFilingsMar2008.cfm.
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$25,000.4 Consumer testing reveals widespread ignorance of even basic
financial concepts.5
As the United States economy slides into recession, policymakers
across the political spectrum grasp at one common explanation and
solution: financial illiteracy and financial literacy education (FLE). In
the words of then-Federal Reserve Board Governor Frederic Mishkin:
There can hardly be a better time to make the case for economic and financial
literacy than right now. . . . [W]e face a downturn . . . fueled, at least in part, by
unwise mortgage borrowing . . . .
. . . [A] better-informed citizenry would likely have resulted in more-prudent
decision making and . . . less harm to the economy.6

The embrace of FLE is not new. It has enjoyed widespread public
support in the United States going back to at least the 1930s.7 Many
states require their schools to teach it, the federal government devotes
financial and logistical resources to it, and financial institutions and
community organizations offer it.8 When government agencies pursue
financial services firms for violations of consumer protection statutes,

4. RUTH HELMAN ET AL., EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., AMERICANS MUCH
MORE WORRIED ABOUT RETIREMENT, HEALTH COSTS A BIG CONCERN 13 fig.10 (2008),
http://www.ebri.com/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_04-2008.pdf.
5. See, e.g., Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, Baby Boomer Retirement
Security: The Roles of Planning, Financial Literacy, and Housing Wealth, 54 J.
MONETARY ECON. 205, 215, 216 tbl.5 (2007) (reporting that over 80% of baby boomers
approaching retirement could not correctly answer the following question: “Let’s say
you have 200 dollars in a savings account. The account earns 10 percent interest per
year. How much would you have in the account at the end of two years?”).
6. Frederic S. Mishkin, Governor, Fed. Reserve Sys., The Importance of
Economic Education and Financial Literacy, Speech at the Third National Summit on
Economic and Financial Literacy (Feb. 27, 2008). Accord President George W. Bush,
Remarks by the President in Roundtable Interview with Business Reporters (Aug. 8,
2007), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/09/
AR2007080900780_pf.html (stating in response to skyrocketing home foreclosure rates:
“[T]here needs to be financial education measures in place.”); Bill Analysis, S.B. 1137,
2007–2008 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 11 (Cal. 2008) (“Finally, the stunning lack of financial
literacy was a major contributing factor to the subprime crisis.”); Housing and Economic
Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No: 110-289 § 1132, 122 Stat. 2654, 2727 (2008)
(providing funding for financial literacy education).
7. Leland J. Gordon, Book Review, 6 S. ECON. J. 403, 403 (1940).
8. See LOIS A. VITT ET AL., FANNIE MAE FOUNDATION, PERSONAL FINANCE AND
THE RUSH TO COMPETENCE: FINANCIAL LITERACY EDUCATION IN THE U.S. 13–14 (2000),
http://www.isfs.org/rep_finliteracy.pdf.
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financial education is frequently included as a component of any settlement
agreement.9
FLE is widely believed to turn consumers into responsible and
empowered market players, motivated and competent to handle their
own credit, insurance, savings, and investment matters by confidently
navigating the marketplace.10 In this financially literate world, other
forms of legal regulation of financial products are unnecessary and even
counterproductive.11 This vision depends on the belief that FLE can
not only improve financial behavior, but that it can do so to the degree
necessary for consumers to protect and even increase their welfare in the
modern financial marketplace.

9. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, 10 Wall St. Firms Reach Settlement in Analyst
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2003, at A1 (stating that investment firms have agreed to
settlement terms that include $80 million for investor education); Met Life to Pay Fine
for a Sales Practice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1998, at B7 (explaining the settlement of
claims alleging deceptive life insurance sale tactics includes money for consumer
education); Press Release, Att’y Gen. of Pa., Attorney General Corbett Announces
$200,000 Settlement in Lehigh Valley College Probe; Funds Will Support New
Statewide Education Program for Consumer Credit Issues (Feb. 20, 2008), available at
http://www.attorneygeneral.gov/press.aspx?id=3417 (“[T]he civil penalties and costs
included in this settlement will be used to help launch a new statewide education
program about consumer credit, helping every Pennsylvania family make wise choices
about college financing, credit cards, home loans and other financial issues.”); Press
Release, State of Cal., California Department of Corporations Announces Ameriquest
Mortgage to Pay $325 Million and Undertake Compliance Reforms to Settle States’
Investigations (Jan. 23, 2006), available at http://www.corp.ca.gov/press/pdf/2006/
nr0601.pdf (announcing the settlement of predatory mortgage lending charges will
include $30 million that states can use for, inter alia, financial literacy education).
10. The State of Financial Literacy and Education in America: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 55 (2002) (statement of
Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/02_02hrg/020502/grnspan.htm.
11. See, e.g., Calculated Risk: Assessing Non-Traditional Mortgage Products:
Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Housing and Transportation and S. Subcomm. on
Economic Policy of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong.
6 (2006) (prepared testimony of George Hanzimanolis, President-Elect, National
Association of Mortgage Brokers), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/
hanzimanolis.pdf.
[C]onsumer education is the cornerstone of any effort geared to address the
issues facing the mortgage industry today . . . . No law or regulation should
ever require any mortgage originator to supplant the consumer’s ability to
decide for him or herself what is or is not an appropriate loan product. As the
decision-maker, the role of the consumer is to acquire the financial acumen
necessary and take advantage of the competitive marketplace, shop, compare,
ask questions and expect answers.
Id. See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-100, FINANCIAL LITERACY
AND EDUCATION COMMISSION: FURTHER PROGRESS NEEDED TO ENSURE AN EFFECTIVE
NATIONAL STRATEGY 1 (Dec. 2006) (“[F]inancial markets function best when consumers
understand how financial services providers and products work and know how to choose
among them.”).
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Although this vision is seductive to conservatives and liberals alike,
the necessary predicate belief in the efficacy of FLE is largely based on
ideology rather than evidence. The U.S. Financial Literacy and Education
Commission, created to spearhead the federal government’s involvement
in FLE, issued a 2006 report that makes claim after claim about what
FLE can achieve, although it simultaneously observes that “there is little
research on successful methods for financial education.”12 Financial
literacy program advocates make their case by presenting lists of dire
statistics about how little Americans know about financial matters and
detailing how poorly they are managing their financial affairs.13 But
they do not demonstrate that FLE will cure these ills. Policymakers
throw mandatory financial education and counseling at problems of
bankruptcy and home mortgage foreclosures without proof that the
education will help.14 Legal academics routinely suggest FLE as a solution
to consumer personal finance problems; however, they assume FLE’s
efficacy without evidence.15
The resources spent on financial literacy education and the opportunity
costs of pursuing financial literacy, rather than other public policies that
might improve consumer financial conditions, call for empirical assessment
of FLE’s effectiveness. Although cited by policymakers as support for
financial literacy initiatives,16 research to date has yet to produce

12. U.S. FIN. LITERACY & EDUC. COMM’N, TAKING OWNERSHIP OF THE FUTURE:
THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR FINANCIAL LITERACY xi (2006).
13. See, e.g., JUMP$TART COAL. FOR PERS. FIN. LITERACY, MAKING THE CASE FOR
FINANCIAL LITERACY—2008 (2008), http://www.jumpstart.org/fileindex.cfm.
14. E.g., Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 11
U.S.C. § 1328(g)(1) (2006) (requiring FLE as a condition of consumer bankruptcy
discharge); Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C.S. § 1701x
(LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2008 amendments) (funding FLE with the goal of preventing
foreclosures); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E (2000) (requiring FLE as a condition for
obtaining a high cost home mortgage).
15. E.g., Michael S. Barr, Access to Financial Services in the 21st Century: Five
Opportunities for the Bush Administration and the 107th Congress, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 447, 460–61 (2002); Howell E. Jackson & Stacy A. Anderson, Can
States Tax National Banks to Educate Consumers About Predatory Lending Practices?,
30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 831, 880 (2007); Creola Johnson, Maxed Out College
Students: A Call to Limit Credit Card Solicitations on College Campuses, 8 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 191, 245 (2005).
16. For example, a bill introduced in the U.S. Congress claims:
An evaluation by the National Endowment for Financial Education High
School Financial Planning Program undertaken jointly with the United States
Department of Agriculture Cooperative State Research, Education, and
Extension Service demonstrates that as little as 10 hours of classroom
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reliable, statistically significant evidence of effectiveness. Past literature
reviews generally have approached the subject with the goal of
“Building the Case for Financial Education.”17 A 2007 review out of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Virginia, after recognizing many of the
methodological problems in the existing research and without locating a
single instance of replicated results, surprises the reader with the
following: “Generally, we can conclude from this literature review that
there is a need for financial education and that many existing approaches
are effective.”18
This Article aims to fill the gap in the literature by critically examining
the studies commonly cited as evidence of the effectiveness of FLE. By
way of introduction, the Article sets forth the model underlying public
and policymaker support for financial literacy programs today. The
Article’s critique of existing findings regarding FLE is paired with
explanations of the barriers to better research. The Article recommends
further investigation of a number of alternative public policies suggested
by the FLE studies. The concluding section asks researchers to help

instruction can impart substantial knowledge and affect significant change in
how teens handle their money.
A Bill to Promote Youth Financial Education, S. 925, 109th Cong., 2–3 (2005),
apparently referencing Sharon M. Danes, Evaluation of the National Endowment for
Financial Education High School Financial Planning Program 5 (2003–2004)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author, available at http://hsfpp.nefe.org/
loadFile.cfm?cont entid=273). In his statement before a 2006 Senate hearing, Federal
Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke cited: Abdighani Hirad & Peter Zorn,
Prepurchase Homeownership Counseling: A Little Knowledge is a Good Thing, in LOWINCOME HOMEOWNERSHIP: EXAMINING THE UNEXAMINED GOAL 146, 146 (Nicholas
Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2002); Marsha Courchane & Peter Zorn, Consumer
Literacy and Creditworthiness 23, 25 (Apr. 7–8, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/cedric/files/2005_conf_paper_session3
_courchane.pdf; Kimberly Gartner & Richard M. Todd, Effectiveness of Online “Early
Intervention” Financial Education for Credit Cardholders 8, 15 (July 2005) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/cedric/files/
2005_conf_paper_session3_todd.pdf; Gregory Elliehausen et al., The Impact of Credit
Counseling on Subsequent Borrower Credit Usage and Payment Behavior 49–50 (Jan.
2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http://www.chicagofed.
org/cedric/files/2003_conf_paper_session1_staten.pdf [hereinafter Elliehausen et al. I].
Improving Financial Literacy in the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (May 23, 2006) (statement of Ben S.
Bernanke, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board), available at http://banking.senate.
gov/public/_files/bernankel. pdf. All of these cited studies use data, methods, or
measures that seriously undermine their conclusions, as explained further below.
17. Jonathan Fox et al., Building the Case for Financial Education, 39 J.
CONSUMER AFF. 195, 195 (2005).
18. Matthew Martin, A Literature Review on the Effectiveness of Financial
Education 22 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, Working Paper No. 07-03, 2007),
available at http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/working_papers/2007/
pdf/wp07-3.pdf.
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policymakers and the public better understand the limits of empirical
findings regarding the effectiveness of FLE.
II. THE IMPLICIT MODEL OF EFFECTIVE FINANCIAL
LITERACY EDUCATION
Consumer financial education is conducted through classroom teaching,
self-study materials, informational websites, interactive games, and the
educational component of counseling. Programs vary in content, audience,
and methodology. But they all aim to achieve welfare-enhancing financial
behavior engaged in by consumers as the result of acquired financial
literacy. Such literacy requires both cognitive knowledge and skills and
a well-calibrated degree of psychological confidence in that knowledge
and those skills. Hogarth has elaborated on the cognitive components as
“being knowledgeable, educated, and informed on the issues of managing
money and assets, banking, investments, credit, insurance, and taxes”
and “understanding the basic concepts underlying the management of
money and assets (e.g. the time value of money in investments and the
pooling of risks in insurance).”19 Turning this cognitive literacy into
positive action requires a particular degree of confidence—neither
underconfidence,20 nor overconfidence.21
Ultimately, FLE is only effective if it enables consumers, given their
financial resource constraints, to make the decisions and to take the
actions necessary for financial well-being today.22 Effectiveness must
19. Jeanne M. Hogarth, Financial Literacy and Family and Consumer Sciences, 94
J. FAM. & CONSUMER SCI. 14, 15–16 (2002).
20. E.g., Danes, supra note 16, at 2 (identifying boosting students’ confidence in
their financial acumen as one goal of FLE).
21. E.g., VITT ET AL., supra note 8, at 23 (asserting that overconfidence “costs
consumers millions of dollars each year”); Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Trading
Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual
Investors, 55 J. FIN. 773, 774 (2000) (explaining that individual investors sufficiently
confident to make frequent trades in their portfolio have lower returns). Although little
discussed in the FLE literature, research in behavioral economics indicates that even
knowledge, skills, and well-calibrated confidence will not necessarily produce good
financial decisions. As I have discussed at length elsewhere, heuristics, biases, and
emotional coping mechanisms that interfere with good decisionmaking are ubiquitous in
personal finance. See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94
IOWA L. REV. 197, 226–48 (2008). Policy measures designed to ameliorate consumer
finance problems must address these behavioral barriers to better financial
decisionmaking.
22. NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR FIN. EDUC., CLOSING THE GAP BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE
AND B EHAVIOR : TURNING EDUCATION INTO A CTION 2 (2005), http://www.nefe.org/
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therefore be measured against the decisions and actions that our society
and marketplace require.
The demands of contemporary personal financial management are
prodigious and varied. A Federal Reserve Board consumer handbook
explains that, in shopping for a home mortgage, “[t]o compare two
ARMs [adjustable-rate mortgages] with each other or to compare an
ARM with a fixed-rate mortgage, you need to know about indexes,
margins, discounts, caps on rates and payments, negative amortization,
payment options, and recasting (recalculating) your loan.”23 Retirement
planning skills, including the ability to predict rates of return—even if
“past performance is no guarantee of future results”24—are similarly
complex. A worksheet from the U.S. Department of Labor booklet Taking
the Mystery Out of Retirement Planning, located on the following page,
exemplifies the government’s expectations of consumer proficiency.
Accompanying directions explain that for Column 1, the consumer
must project future savings and asset purchases, and for Column 2, the
consumer must select “a savings growth factor representing 3, 5, or 7
percent rates of return, depending on how much you believe each of the
worksheet items will increase in value.”25

tabid/86/Default.aspx (follow “Closing the Gap Between Knowledge and Behavior”
hyperlink).
23. BD. OF GOVERNORS, U.S. FED. RESERVE SYS., CONSUMER HANDBOOK ON
ADJUSTABLE-RATE MORTGAGES 4 (2006), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/arms/
armsbrochure.pdf.
24. MARK T. HEBNER, INDEX FUNDS: THE 12-STEP PROGRAM FOR ACTIVE
INVESTORS 94 (2005) (“[S]ome variation of the disclaimer ‘past performance is no
guarantee of future results’ must appear in all mutual fund advertisements and
prospectuses . . . .”).
25. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, TAKING THE MYSTERY OUT OF RETIREMENT PLANNING
14, 47 (2006), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/nearretirement.pdf.

422

WILLIS_FINAL_ARTICLE[1]

7/7/2009 4:53:42 PM

[VOL. 46: 415, 2009]

Evidence and Ideology
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

NEW SAVINGS BETWEEN NOW AND RETIREMENT
SAVINGS GROWTH FACTORS FOR THREE SELECTED RATES OF RETURN
139.741 for 3%

Work-related retirement
savings
401(k) or 403(b)
Keogh
SEP-IRA
SIMPLE IRA
Other
IRAs (traditional)
IRAs (Roth)
Other
Home equity
Market value of
home
Mortgage and liens
(enter as positive
amount)
Personal savings and
investments
Other assets
(collections, etc.)
TOTAL ASSETS

155.282 for 5%
1
Estimated monthly
savings amount

173.085 for 7%

2
Savings growth
factor

3
Value of savings in
10 years
(Column 1 x Column 2)

Consumers with limited resources might never have a mortgage or
own a 401(k), but mere budgeting may require them to make economic
forecasts that elude experts because incomes in low-wage sector jobs can
be uncertain and variable from one week to the next.26 These sectors
26. HEATHER BOUSHEY ET AL., CTR. FOR ECON. POLICY & RESEARCH, UNDERSTANDING
LOW-WAGE WORK IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2007), www.inclusionist.org/files/lowwage
work.pdf. This is not to say that higher income consumers make more accurate
forecasts, but typically their base income is less volatile. See Daniel L. Tortorice,
Unemployment Expectations and the Business Cycle 24–26 (Nov. 15, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://people.brandeis.edu/~tortoric/Papers/
UnempExpBCFinal.pdf (finding that consumer expectations about unemployment reflect
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also provide fewer employee benefits.27 Consequently, low-wage consumers
need the literacy to shop for insurance and retirement savings vehicles
on the open market, without the expertise or bargaining power of a
human resources department.
Some discussions of FLE assume that poor financial outcomes evidence
“bad” financial behavior and that “good” decisions and behaviors always
lead to good outcomes.28 But this is both too onerous and too weak a
demand. Resource constraints, job loss, disability, discrimination, and
natural disasters can prevent consumers from enjoying good financial
outcomes no matter how high their literacy and how welfare-enhancing
their behaviors. For example, paying bills late is generally classified as
a “bad” financial behavior reflecting poor cash flow management skills.
However, as Getter explains, “An unanticipated negative [income] shock
can still reduce solvency and trigger delinquencies even for ‘financially
responsible’ households that have accumulated precautionary wealth.”29
Good financial outcomes, standing alone, are likewise not evidence of
literacy or welfare-enhancing behaviors. Given sufficient resources and
a professional financial advisor, even the most spendthrift financial
illiterate may experience good financial outcomes.
Diagrammed, the model of effective FLE implicitly endorsed by
policymakers and advocates appears:

Financial Education  Financial Literacy  Good Financial Decisions & Behavior

III. THE LIMITS OF EXISTING RESEARCH ON FINANCIAL
LITERACY EDUCATION
Policymakers routinely cite a number of studies for the proposition
that the financial literacy education model works.30 However, the
academics who have performed this research generally do not make such
recent past experience, such that they are overly optimistic at the beginning of a
recession and overly pessimistic at the end of a recession, and that higher income and
more education reduce these errors in expectations only slightly).
27. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-355, EMPLOYER-SPONSORED
HEALTH AND RETIREMENT BENEFITS 9 (2007).
28. For example, studies that use credit report data to assess FLE such as
Courchane & Zorn, supra note 16, and Elliehausen et al. I, supra note 16, implicitly
assume that the presence or absence of derogatory information recorded in a credit report
is evidence of bad or good decisions and behaviors, respectively.
29. Darryl E. Getter, Contributing to the Delinquency of Borrowers, 37 J.
CONSUMER AFF. 86, 99 (2003).
30. For examples, see supra note 16.
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a sweeping claim. Despite resourceful data collection methods, ingenious
research designs, and rigorous statistical analysis techniques, researchers
have been unable to overcome problems with data reliability, controls on
conditions, measure validity, and interpretation of results.31
A. Data Reliability Issues
1.

Self-Reports

Research on FLE often relies on surveys in which consumers evaluate
the education, assess their own knowledge, report their behaviors, reveal
their financial condition, or recall their exposure to FLE.32 But responses to
surveys conducted to evaluate FLE are vulnerable to social desirability,
demand characteristic, and selective recall biases. As explained below,
each of these errors is likely to inflate estimates of the efficacy of FLE.
Their cumulative effect indicates that relying on survey data to
demonstrate the effectiveness of FLE is unsound.
Survey data on any topic contains errors. Sometimes errors are small
and randomly distributed. Other times, errors are large and systematic.
When widespread social norms favor a particular behavior, consumers
overreport engaging in that behavior.33 When respondents believe that
administrators want a particular response, results are skewed in favor of
that response.34 Misreporting can also reflect respondents’ misperceptions

31. This article does not catalog every weakness of every study; it sets forth the
widespread weaknesses in the empirical work and provides selective examples of each.
Most studies suffer from more than one such weakness.
32. E.g., VITT ET AL., supra note 8, at 2, 7; Angela C. Lyons et al., Are We Making
the Grade? A National Overview of Financial Education and Program Evaluation, 40 J.
CONSUMER AFF. 208, 217 (2006).
33. Roger Tourangeau & Ting Yan, Sensitive Questions in Surveys, 133 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 859, 861 (2007) (discussing the problem of social desirability bias, which makes it
“difficult or impossible” for researchers “to distinguish among (a) respondents who are
actually highly compliant with social norms, (b) those who have a sincere but inflated
view of themselves, and (c) those who are deliberately trying to make a favorable
impression by falsely reporting positive things about themselves”).
34. Martin T. Orne, On the Social Psychology of the Psychological Experiment:
With Particular Reference to Demand Characteristics and Their Implications, 17 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 776, 778 (1962) (discussing tendency of subjects to “behave in an
experimental context in a manner designed to play the role of a ‘good subject’ or, in
other words, to validate the experimental hypothesis”).
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or unconscious biases favoring beliefs, recollections, or predictions
about their own behavior consistent with self-concept.35
In surveys taken at or after completion of a personal finance course,
consumers on the whole report that the course was effective and that
they will or already have improved their financial behavior.36 Demand
characteristics render these responses suspect. Consumers likely overreport
the extent to which they are following their teachers’ instructions. As
the review out of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond notes, “[A]fter
employees sit through over four hours of training, they are likely to say
they learned something” and “they are likely to praise the company that
provided the training as a courtesy, if nothing else.”37 Field data supports
this conjecture; although Braucher’s analysis of an FLE program for
bankruptcy debtors revealed a small negative effect on financial
outcomes,38 the participants rated the classes highly.39
The belief in the efficacy of FLE is propagated by the programs. One
of the first items in the American Homeowner Education and Counseling
Institute’s “core curriculum” is “the importance of education.”40 When
participation is voluntary, programs use “marketing techniques” to induce
consumers to incur childcare and transportation costs and spend time

35. MARK L. MITCHELL & JANINA M. JOLLEY, RESEARCH DESIGN EXPLAINED 213–
15 (6th ed. 2007).
36. See, e.g., Sissy Osteen et al., Financial Management Education: Its Role in
Changing Behavior, 45 J. EXTENSION No. 3RIB2, at 4–5 (2007), available at
http://www.joe.org/joe/2007june/rb2.shtml (presenting data reflecting self-reports of
behavior change among participants in the Money 2000™ financial education program);
Robert L. Clark et al., Retirement Plans and Saving Decisions: The Role of Information
and Education, 5 J. PENSION ECON. & FIN. 45, 62 tbl.6 (2006) (presenting data on selfreported expectations of future behavior change among recipients of retirement-related
financial education); Richard L. Wiener et al., Debtor Education, Financial Literacy,
and Pending Bankruptcy Legislation, 23 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 347, 347 (2005) (presenting
data reflecting self-reports of behavior change among bankruptcy debtors who received
financial education); Danes, supra note 16, at 11 tbl.7, 14 tbl.10 (presenting data
reflecting self-reports of positive behavioral changes among high school students who
had participated in a financial literacy program).
37. Martin, supra note 18, at 14.
38. Jean Braucher, An Empirical Study of Debtor Education in Bankruptcy: Impact
on Chapter 13 Completion Not Shown, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 557, 578–79 (2001).
39. Id. at 567, 585. Cf. E. Bere et al., Outcome and Process Evaluation of a
Norwegian School-Randomized Fruit and Vegetable Intervention, 21 HEALTH EDUC.
RES. 258 (2006), available at http://her.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/21/2/258
(explaining that although teachers rated a fruit and vegetable education program
positively and students reported that they enjoyed it, the program failed in its goal to
increase student fruit and vegetable intake).
40. Alan Mallach, Homeownership Education and Counseling: Issues in Research
and Definition 23 tbl.5 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/community-development/publications/discussion-papers/
homeowner.pdf.
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attending class rather than earning income.41 Regardless of whether these
programs improve financial decisions and behavior, they may either
convince participants to believe in FLE’s efficacy or screen out the
nonbelievers at the first class.
Misperception and overoptimism can also skew survey responses
unidirectionally. For example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture has
reported results from its Financial Security in Later Life course: of
nearly 50,000 Americans who attended the course and completed a
survey, nearly 90% said that they “increased their financial knowledge.”42
But comparing self-assessments to performance tests shows that
consumers think that they learn more from FLE than they do. In one
experiment, well-educated consumers approaching retirement who were
given financial training believed that their financial planning skills had
improved.43 However, although they increased their factual knowledge,
they did not increase their ability to make good financial decisions at a
statistically significant level; they continued to overestimate retirement
income by many years.44 Thus, consumer self-assessments must be taken
as a measure of confidence—or overconfidence—rather than literacy.
Society views many personal financial decisions and behaviors as
having a normative valence, raising the problem of social desirability
bias. In anonymous surveys unconnected with FLE, Americans overstate
their good financial habits and understate their poor habits. For example,
about 60% claim that they pay off their credit card balances in full every
month, but card issuer data shows that the number is closer to 40%.45 In
the Survey of Consumer Finances, families disclose on average about a
third as much credit card debt as issuers report to the Federal Reserve.46

41. Margaret Clancy et al., Financial Education and Savings Outcomes in
Individual Development Accounts 3 (Wash. Univ. Ctr. for Soc. Dev., Working Paper No.
01-2, 2001), available at http://csd.wustl.edu/Publications/Documents/65.Financial
EducationAndSavingsOutcomes.pdf.
42. U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., COOP. STATE RESEARCH, EDUC., & EXTENSION SERV.,
FINANCIAL SECURITY IN LATER LIFE IMPACT REPORT 1 (2006), http://www.csrees
.usda.gov/nea/economics/pdfs/fsll_impacts_jan06.pdf [hereinafter IMPACT REPORT].
43. Douglas A. Hershey et al., Challenges of Training Pre-Retirees to Make Sound
Financial Planning Decisions, 24 EDUC. GERONTOLOGY 447, 468 (1998).
44. Id.
45. Larry Getlen, Why We Lie About Money and Debt, BANKRATE.COM, Apr. 28,
2005, http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/financial-literacy2004/debt-psychology.asp.
46. TAMARA DRAUT & JAVIER SILVA, DMOS, BORROWING TO MAKE ENDS MEET:
THE GROWTH OF CREDIT CARD DEBT IN THE ‘90S 7, 10 (2003), http://archive.demos.org/
pubs/borrowing_to_make_ends_meet.pdf.
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Financial literacy programs attempt to reinforce social messages to
consumers about the desirability of engaging in particular financial
behaviors. With this in mind, consumers are likely to consciously or
unconsciously exaggerate their behavioral change after FLE. Mandell,
who runs the Jump$tart Coalition’s annual nationwide test of high
school seniors, has consistently found that—controlling for family
income, intention to attend college, and other factors associated with
differences in scores—students who have taken personal finance classes
score no better on that test, but report higher levels of thriftiness than
their peers.47 Although Mandell hypothesizes that the classes increase
savings without increasing literacy, an explanation at least as plausible is
that the classes affect self-reporting but not actual thriftiness. Analyses
of the effectiveness of the heavily promoted Money 2000™ and the
National Endowment for Financial Education High School Financial
Planning programs suffer from a similar reliance on self-reports of
financial behaviors.48
Bernheim and Garrett used self-reports of financial condition to
conclude that workplace financial education stimulates savings.49 They
concede that “education may [a]ffect reporting, rather than behavior,”
but they argue that (a) if education causes people to inflate their savings
behavior, then it should cause them to inflate their overall wealth and
spouse savings behavior, and (b) their data does not show any correlation
between education and reported wealth or spouse behavior.50 This assumes
that only intentional misreporting inflates consumer responses to savings
questions and that consumers possess sufficient financial literacy and
forethought to inflate their savings and wealth numbers in a consistent
manner. In reality, social desirability bias could cause respondents
unconsciously to report their intended or wishful savings behavior.
Indeed, even if misreporting is conscious, people are not very consistent
liars. Bernheim and Garrett’s data suggest erroneous overreporting of
retirement savings—8.8% of respondents stated higher rates of saving
for retirement than rates of saving for all purposes.51 Further, financial
issues are a major source of marital discord, and spouses typically disagree

47. Lewis Mandell, Financial Literacy—Does It Matter? 12 (Apr. 8, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author), available at http://www.jumpstartcoalition.org/upload/
Mandell%20Paper%20April%202005.doc.
48. Osteen et al., supra note 36; Danes, supra note 16, at 2.
49. B. Douglas Bernheim & Daniel M. Garrett, The Effects of Financial Education
in the Workplace: Evidence from a Survey of Households, 87 J. PUB. ECON. 1487, 1489
(2003).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1515.
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on the family’s income, wealth, and debt.52 Consumers exposed to FLE
might inflate their own savings numbers in contrast to their spouses’
numbers.
Studies that survey consumers about past participation in FLE to
assess the relationship between FLE and outcomes may suffer from
selective recall. To estimate the effect of past education on current
creditworthiness, Courchane and Zorn relied on data from a Freddie Mac
survey that asked consumers whether they had learned about personal
finance in courses or seminars.53 However, respondents who have
experienced financial setbacks might answer that they had not “learned”
from courses or seminars, and they might not even recall courses or
seminars that they had attended. Contrariwise, respondents who have
experienced financial success would be prone to believe that they
learned from FLE and to better recall having received FLE. Analyses
that rely on respondent recall of whether past employers offered
financial education54 have the same weakness—selective recall is likely
to distort estimates of FLE effectiveness upwards.
2.

Unrepresentative Samples

No voluntary survey receives a perfect response rate. When respondents
do not systematically differ from nonrespondents, the response rate does
not need to be high for the data to be valuable. However, voluntary
surveys of consumers who attend FLE classes are nigh destined to
reflect a nonresponse bias, in that the sample that completes the surveys
is unlikely to be representative of the population surveyed.
Financial educators complain that surveys given at the completion of
courses “are simply too long—unduly taxing program participants . . .
[which] unnecessarily drives down response rates.”55 Participants who
believe that they learned the most are likely to complete the survey at

52. Jay L. Zagorsky, Husbands’ and Wives’ Views of the Family Finances, 32 J.
SOCIO-ECON. 127, 127 (2003).
53. Courchane & Zorn, supra note 16, at 2.
54. E.g., Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia Mitchell, Financial Literacy and Retirement
Planning: New Evidence from the Rand American Life Panel 5 (Univ. of Mich. Ret. Res.
Ctr., Working Paper No. 2007-157, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1095869.
55. Lyons et al., supra note 32, at 218.
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higher rates, whether out of a sense of pride or reciprocity.56 The net
effect is to inflate the results in favor of finding FLE to be effective.
The population that completes follow-up surveys is no doubt even less
representative. Wiener and his colleagues, in their experimental testing
of the efficacy of FLE given to bankruptcy debtors, ran into this problem.
For the test instrument that the experimenters sent three months after
conducting financial training sessions, response rates varied dramatically;
for debtors who received the training the response rate was 34%, for
debtors who did not receive the training it was 56%, and for nondebtors
it was 71%.57 Those who had participated in the program—who, if they
felt it had helped them, would have had the most motivation to complete
the survey, but who also would be the most embarrassed to report not
having changed their behavior—were the least likely to respond.
The National Endowment for Financial Education advertises that three
months after completing its ten-hour High School Financial Planning
Program, over half the students improved their spending and saving habits.58
However, only 17% of the students responded, meaning that about 10%
of the students who completed the program reported improved financial
habits.59 Because those who, accurately or inaccurately, believe that they
improved their behavior have more impetus to report their improvement,
it is plausible that few nonrespondents saw any improvement. Further,
high school students who voluntarily complete and return a survey three
months after a program might be unusually approval-seeking and obedient,
personality traits predisposing them to exaggerate good behavior.
Given the likelihood that response rates are biased, it is not possible to
conclude from studies with low response rates that FLE changed
participant financial decisions and behavior.
3.

Barriers to Better Data Collection Methods

If survey data is so unreliable, and those who complete them
unrepresentative, why do academics use these sources? Why do researchers

56. Cf. Christiane Spitzmüller et al., Survey Nonrespondents as Bad Soldiers:
Examining the Relationship Between Organizational Citizenship and Survey Response
Behavior, 15 INT’L J. SELECTION & ASSESSMENT 449, 450 (2007) (finding that survey
respondents had more courteous personalities and a stronger sense of reciprocal social
obligations to others than nonrespondents); Steven G. Rogelberg et al., Profiling Active
and Passive Nonrespondents to an Organizational Survey, 88 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1104,
1111–12 (2003) (finding that intentional decisions not to respond to surveys were caused
by dissatisfaction with the entity performing the survey and that unintentional failures to
respond were caused by a lack of conscientiousness).
57. See Wiener et al., supra note 36, at 353.
58. Danes, supra note 16, at 16.
59. Id. at 6.
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not objectively test financial knowledge and skills before and after finance
courses? Why do they not track consumer decisions and behavior before
and after FLE through longitudinal observation?
Educators explain that their clients do not want to be tested. The U.S.
Department of Agriculture Cooperative Extension Service warns teachers of
its Financial Security in Later Life course that if they attempt to evaluate
the program by giving tests, “some adult audiences may be turned off by
having to take a ‘test,’ and choose not to continue participation in the
program.”60 Educators are unlikely to permit testing of their students for
fear of deterring participation. If researchers did test students, the
manipulation might create attrition bias; consumers who withdrew to
avoid testing would differ from those who continued with the course,
and these differences would probably correlate with factors that affect
outcomes.61
Tracking financial behavior is even more difficult. Because we generally
do not know who will participate in FLE in the future, academics can
view pre-FLE behavior only retrospectively, when the consumer’s memory
has faded or has been distorted by ensuing events. Direct observation of
consumer decisionmaking after FLE, were it logistically possible, would
alter behavior. Decisions are therefore usually observed only after they
are made, in effect observing outcomes rather than behavior. However, as
discussed above, outcomes are influenced by more than behavior, and
behavior is not always accurately reflected in outcomes. In addition,
consumers frequently find surveys about their finances invasive and will
not answer the questions.62
One way to increase consumers’ willingness to be tested and to respond
to follow-up surveys would be to provide incentives for them to do so.
However, as the next section explains, such incentives can introduce the
problem of confounds.63
60. U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC. COOP. STATE RESEARCH, EDUC., & EXTENSION SERV.,
FINANCIAL SECURITY IN LATER LIFE, TOOLS FOR EDUCATORS, http://www.csrees.usda.gov/
nea/economics/fsll/edu_intro.html (follow “Program Evaluations and Accountability”
hyperlink; then follow “FSLL Eval Tools and Ideas—Participant Changes” hyperlink).
61. Paul N. Bloom & Gary T. Ford, Evaluation of Consumer Education Programs,
6 J. CONSUMER RES. 270, 272 (1979).
62. See Lyons et al., supra note 32, at 219.
63. To avoid the biases inherent in surveys and to obtain longitudinal data, some
researchers, using exacting procedures to maintain consumer anonymity, have managed
to obtain credit bureau reports and credit scores. E.g., Gregory Elliehausen et al., The
Impact of Credit Counseling on Subsequent Borrower Behavior, 41 J. CONSUMER AFF. 1,
3 (2007) [hereinafter Elliehausen et al. II]; Courchane & Zorn, supra note 16, at 3–4.

431

WILLIS_FINAL_ARTICLE[1]

7/7/2009 4:53:42 PM

B. Research Design Issues
1. Confounds
Financial education is frequently bundled with other forms of assistance,
in part to encourage participation in FLE. As a result, the contribution
of the education to any changes in participant behaviors is uncertain.
Programs that provide financial assistance with their classes may lead to
better outcomes due to the former rather than the latter.64 For example,
the American Dream Demonstration project conducted an FLE program
for low-income consumers and gave the participants one to seven dollars
for every dollar that they saved,65 obscuring the effect of the FLE component
of the project. Studies of FLE coupled with homebuyer down payment
assistance or reduced mortgage interest rates suffer from the same problem.66
Confounding assistance need not be tangible. Financial counseling
may improve financial outcomes due to noneducative components of the
process rather than any change in literacy. “Counseling” includes actions
that counselors take on behalf of their clients. Some homeownership
counselors admit that their interventions on behalf of consumers are more
effective than their interactions with consumers.67 Credit counselors can
negotiate payment plans that reduce interest rates, fees, and minimum
payments.68 Counselor intervention can alleviate consumer stress, which
may improve health and increase employability and productivity, potentially
increasing income69 without increasing financial literacy.
Merely disputing errors on a client’s credit report can have an effect.
About half of the sixteen million credit reports sent to consumers each
year result in a question or dispute, and of the formal disputes lodged,
over half result in a change to the credit report.70 Results of studies that

But measuring FLE efficacy through credit report and score changes is problematic for
reasons discussed in Part III.C.3, infra.
64. Mallach, supra note 40, at 7–8.
65. MARK SCHREINER ET AL., WASH. UNIV. CTR. FOR SOC. DEV., SAVING
PERFORMANCE IN THE AMERICAN DREAM DEMONSTRATION: A NATIONAL DEMONSTRATION OF
INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNTS 3 (2002), http://csd.wustl.edu/Publications/Documents/
ADDReport2002.pdf.
66. See Roberto G. Quercia & Susan M. Wachter, Homeownership Counseling
Performance: How Can It Be Measured?, 7 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 175, 185, 196 (1996)
(discussing this methodological problem with studies of homeownership counseling
efficacy).
67. Mallach, supra note 40, at 11.
68. Elliehausen et al. I, supra note 16, at 2.
69. Jinhee Kim et al., Relationships Among Credit Counseling Clients’ Financial
Well Being, Financial Behaviors, Financial Stressor Events, and Health, 14 FIN.
COUNSELING & PLAN. 75, 84 (2003).
70. The Accuracy of Credit Report Information and the Fair Credit Reporting Act:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 21
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use credit bureau reports and credit scores to assess outcomes could
reflect counselor-initiated changes in the credit report data rather than
consumer changes in behavior, skewing results toward findings that
policymakers interpret as evidence that FLE works.71
Even when they do not take actions on behalf of clients, counselors
and teachers in small class settings can give consumers personalized advice
and written action plans. Compliance with these specific instructions
might improve finances regardless of whether the consumer increases
financial literacy in the process. For example, because “[t]he first
requirement for credit counseling clients is to cut up all their credit cards
and close the accounts,”72 all but the noncompliant consumers who
attend counseling should close these accounts. Findings of investigations
that use a reduction in the number of open accounts as evidence of
improved financial behavior73 could reflect counselor persuasiveness and
consumer obedience rather than any effect of FLE.
A frequently cited analysis by Hirad and Zorn of participants in
Freddie Mac’s Affordable Gold mortgage program found that, controlling
for selection effects, classroom-based homeownership counseling
significantly reduced mortgage delinquency rates.74 Without testing
consumer knowledge, the title of their paper attributes these good outcomes
to “knowledge” gained through the counseling. But in the text, the
authors also note: “Counseling is specific and tailored to the particular
needs of the individual . . . . Classroom counseling also can fall into this
category because, although it is administered to a group of borrowers, it
too can give borrowers personal attention . . . .”75 It is therefore plausible
that these consumers received direct assistance and personal financial
advice, and that following instructions, rather than changes in knowledge,
contributed to the reduction in delinquency rates.
Elliehausen, Lundquist, and Staten compared credit reports of consumers
who had received counseling with credit reports of consumers who had

(2003) (statement of Stuart K. Pratt, President, Consumer Data Industry Association),
available at http://banking.senate.gov/03_07hrg/071003/pratt.pdf.
71. E.g., Elliehausen et al. II, supra note 63, at 7 (using Emprica credit scores as a
“comprehensive and objective measure of creditworthiness” to measure changes in
behavior). Problems with using credit reports and credit scores are discussed further in
Part III.C.3, infra.
72. Kim et al., supra note 69, at 77.
73. Elliehausen et al. II, supra note 63, at 26–27.
74. Hirad & Zorn, supra note 16, at 162–63.
75. Id. at 148.
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not, controlling for a number of other factors, and found that counseled
consumers experienced comparatively more improvement in creditworthiness
during the three years subsequent to the counseling dates.76 They selfpublished a monograph preliminarily attributing their results to “financial
education conducted in a one-on-one setting.”77 This 2003 monograph is
widely cited by policymakers even today as evidence of the effectiveness of
FLE.78 But because the study did not limit the treatment to education,
the 2007 version of this paper—published in a peer-reviewed journal—
concludes only that any greater improvement in credit standing experienced
by counseled consumers is “associated with” counseling.79 As the authors
implicitly recognize, financial changes that they had earlier attributed
to FLE could have been caused by confounding factors.
A variant on this problem was spotted by Braucher in her analysis of
the effects of mandatory FLE on bankruptcy debtors. Before the passage
of the 2005 bankruptcy law requiring all consumer debtors to receive
FLE,80 some bankruptcy districts required FLE and some did not. Braucher
compared debtors in the former with those in the latter, controlling for a
variety of other ways in which the populations of consumer bankruptcy
debtors might differ among districts.81 At first blush, the data seemed to
indicate that FLE made a difference—debtors in the districts requiring
the education program were more likely to complete their bankruptcy
debt repayment plans successfully. But on closer analysis, Braucher
determined that the districts requiring the classes also created conditions
that made it easier for debtors to complete their plans. Judges in these
districts approved more lenient payment plans and more frequently
required payments under those plans to be deducted directly from the
consumers’ paychecks—a self-control mechanism rather than education.82

76. Elliehausen et al. I, supra note 16, at 50.
77. Id. at 6. Other work of the Credit Research Center has been criticized for
methodological problems and erroneous assumptions consistently biasing the Center’s
results in favor of the credit industry. For examples, see Elizabeth Warren, The Market
for Data: The Changing Role of Social Sciences in Shaping the Law, 2002 WIS. L. REV.
1, 11–15, 18–19, 41, and sources cited therein.
78. E.g., Bernanke, supra note 16; Financial Literacy and Education: The
Effectiveness of Governmental and Private Sector Initiatives: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Financial Services, 110th Cong. 5 & n.1 (2008) (statement of Sandra F.
Braunstein, Director, Division of Consumer and Community Affairs, U.S. Federal
Reserve System), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/hearing110/braunstein
041508.pdf.; Fox et al., supra note 17, at 201; Kim et al., supra note 69, at 76.
79. Elliehausen et al. II, supra note 63, at 27.
80. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 11
U.S.C. § 1328(g)(1) (2006).
81. Braucher, supra note 38, at 558.
82. Id.
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Once these differences among districts were controlled for, “[e]ducation
resulted in a small, significant and negative effect” on outcomes.83
Similarly, in a study of FLE provided to members of the military,
simple bivariate analyses seemed to show that soldiers who had received
FLE training engaged in slightly better financial behaviors than soldiers
who had not received the training. The soldiers who received the FLE
were relatively more likely to participate in the government’s retirement
savings plan and less likely to buy worthless “life insurance” products
marketed to soldiers.84 However, once controls were added for other factors
such as pay grade, education, and marital status, no positive behaviors
were associated with having taken the course. To the contrary, soldiers who
had received the financial training were, ceteris paribus, more likely to
use informal rather than formal budgeting than soldiers who had not
taken the class.85
These two studies of FLE, provided in the particular settings of
bankruptcy and the military, do not prove that FLE is harmful or
ineffective, but they do demonstrate the susceptibility of analyses of the
effectiveness of FLE to an upward bias due to confounds. Studies that
do not control for potential confounds are not probative evidence
regarding FLE’s effects.
2. Inadequate Controls
The biggest methodological problem that undermines the results of
FLE efficacy studies has been the lack of adequate controls needed to

83. Id. at 578.
84. Catherine Bell et al., Does Financial Education Affect Soldiers’ Financial
Behaviors? 2 (Feb. 18, 2009) (draft paper, 2009 Federal Reserve System Community
Affairs Research Conference). The authors claim that their bivariate results demonstrate
a number of other improvements in financial behavior, id. at 1–2, but all of these suffer
from very serious problems, even absent controls. Most lack statistical significance. A
few, such as comparison shopping for major purchases, were behaviors that the group
who received the education was already doing better than the comparison group prior to
the education, and in one case—paying off credit card bills in full—the group who
received the education only went downhill after the course. Id. at 9 tbl.5, 13 tbl.11. In
addition, although the authors cite decreased use of car title loans as an improvement in
financial behavior, id. at 14 tbl.12, these loans were effectively outlawed for members of
the military during the study period such that the “improvement” in lowered use of car
title loans cannot be attributed to financial education. See Talent Amendment to the
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, Pub. L. 109-364, sec. 670(a), § 987(b), 120 Stat. 2266,
2266 (2006) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 987(b) (effective Oct. 1, 2007)).
85. Bell et al., supra note 84, at 19 & tbl.16.
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demonstrate the causal links from education to literacy to financial
decisions and behaviors. Consumers generally cannot be forced to take
FLE courses. Therefore, the treatment group that academics must use
consists of consumers who choose to receive FLE. Common sense suggests
many unobserved ways in which these consumers differ from those who
do not participate. In addition to being better informed or more
motivated,86 those who attend may have more free time for researching
and making financial decisions or less embarrassment and denial about
personal finance problems or “bad” decisions that they made in the past.
A number of studies support this intuition. College students who
completed an online version of VISA’s Practical Money Skills for Life
course had better financial behaviors than students who were offered but
declined the course, but the former were on average already wealthier,
more educated, and more creditworthy.87 In the Elliehausen, Lundquist,
and Staten study’s raw data, credit counseling produced a 66 point
average increase in credit scores of debtors who had low scores prior to
the counseling—a large change amounting to a 30% reduction in
predicted likelihood of bankruptcy.88 However, after applying statistical
techniques to reduce selection effects, the authors discovered that
counseling produced less than a single point increase in credit score,
indicating that selection, not FLE, was probably responsible for the
higher credit scores of counseled consumers.89 Further, the statistical
technique that they used, a two-stage least squares regression, can
significantly reduce, but cannot eliminate, selection effects.90
Most data sets containing information on FLE and financial outcomes
provide no reliable way to control for selection effects. For example, the
Health and Retirement Study contains data on households whose heads
are between fifty and sixty-one years of age.91 Approximately 10% of
the households in that study stated that they had attended an employersponsored meeting on “retirement planning,” although they gave no
indication of when this meeting took place.92 Using this data set to
evaluate FLE, Lusardi found that the households who reported attending
a retirement planning meeting had saved more for retirement, controlling
86. Bernanke, supra note 16, at 3.
87. Gartner & Todd, supra note 16, at 9.
88. Elliehausen et al. II, supra note 63, at 25.
89. Id. at 18.
90. James Heckman et al., Characterizing Selection Bias Using Experimental
Data, 66 ECONOMETRICA 1017, 1071 (1998).
91. See Annamaria Lusardi, Saving and the Effectiveness of Financial Education,
in PENSION DESIGN AND STRUCTURE: NEW LESSONS FROM BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 157, 172
(Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Utkus eds., 2004).
92. Id. at 164, 165 tbl.9-4 (506 out of 5292 respondents stated that they attended a
meeting on retirement).
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for variables such as demographics and income, and concluded that
“financial education can boost saving, particularly for those with low
financial literacy.”93 But consumers who attended these meetings might
have saved just as much without attending. Perhaps they accumulated
their savings prior to the meeting and attended to learn how to plan their
drawdown rates during retirement. Although the study used an impressive
number of controls, without an instrumental variable that affects attendance
at FLE but does not affect the dependent variable—here, savings—
controlling for selection when subjects attend FLE voluntarily may not
be possible.
Supporting their conclusion that increased financial literacy positively
affects financial behavior, Lusardi and Mitchell find that consumers who
score higher on tests of financial knowledge report having thought more
about retirement.94 To address endogeneity effects—the possibility that
the financial planning led to the financial literacy—the study uses as an
instrumental variable consumer self-reports on how much of their
education, including high school, college, or higher degrees, was devoted to
economics. Having devoted “a lot” of their coursework to economics
has a strong correlation with financial literacy in this sample, providing
some support for the authors’ point that the planning did not cause the
literacy.95
However, even absent an endogeneity effect, selection effects are still
likely. The dataset that Lusardi and Mitchell use—one of the best
datasets collected in this area—does not allow them to demonstrate that
having devoted a lot of schooling to economics is not correlated with
omitted variables that affect retirement planning.96 Yet it is plausible
that the same personality traits that lead consumers in their youth to
choose “a lot” of economics coursework independently lead the same
consumers in adulthood to plan more for retirement. Preliminary
research on determinants of success in economics courses indicates that
students who are goal-oriented and make detailed plans perform better.97
93. Id. at 157.
94. Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 54, at 14.
95. Id. at 14–15.
96. See id. at 15 (suggesting only that economics education is an “arguably exogenous
instrument[]”).
97. E.g., Kurtis J. Swope & Pamela M. Schmitt, The Performance of Economics
Graduates over the Entire Curriculum: The Determinants of Success, 37 J. ECON. EDUC.
387, 392 (2006); Andrea L. Ziegert, The Role of Personality Temperament and Student
Learning in Principles of Economics: Further Evidence, 31 J. ECON. EDUC. 307, 310,
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It seems plausible that success leads to enrollment in more economics
courses, and that the same personality traits that lead to classroom
success lead to more planning for retirement.
In what appears to be the only direct examination of self-selection in
this context, Meier and Sprenger found that consumers who chose to
participate in FLE differed sharply from those who did not.98 Their
experiment offered over 800 low-to-moderate-income consumers waiting in
line for income tax assistance a free fifteen-minute credit counseling
session.99 Testing revealed that those who accepted the offer had
significantly lower financial discount rates—meaning that they were
more willing to wait for a larger financial reward in the future rather
than taking a smaller reward sooner—than those who declined.100
Consumers who accepted also had relatively more education and prior
financial knowledge, although even controlling for these, discount rates
remained significant.101
Those who declined the credit counseling session were surely
influenced by other unmeasured factors, such as a preference for privacy
rather than allowing a stranger to see one’s credit report or a desire not
to be confronted with one’s past credit problems. But the authors’
conclusion—that consumers who choose to participate in FLE concern
themselves more with the future and so are likely to engage in relatively
more welfare-enhancing financial behavior even absent any participation
in FLE102—remains plausible. Given that the “class” in the experiment
required so little time and effort, a real FLE course might be expected to
show stronger selection effects.
In sum, self-selection poses a significant problem for much FLE
research, one that likely biases estimates of the effectiveness of FLE
upwards.
3. Barriers to Better Research Design
A number of researchers have eliminated much of the bias created by
individual self-selection by focusing on settings where FLE is
exogenously set. Bernheim and Garrett, in their workplace financial
education research—critiqued above for reliance on self-reports about
319 (2000). This is the “judging” personality type indicator of the Meyers-Briggs scale.
Id. at 308.
98. Stephan Meier & Charles Sprenger, Selection into Financial Literacy Programs:
Evidence from a Field Study 9–11 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Discussion Paper No.
07-05, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1073158.
99. Id. at 5.
100. Id. at 9–10.
101. Id. at 11.
102. Id. at 12–13.
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personal savings—did not compare employees who participated in FLE
programs with those who did not.103 Instead, to eliminate the biasing effect
of self-selection, they compared employees at workplaces that offered
retirement education and planning assistance with employees at
workplaces that did not.104 In their investigation of the effects of high
school FLE, described further below, Bernheim, Garrett, and Maki
examined differences between consumers who had attended high school
in states that mandated financial education and those who had lived in
states that did not.105 That some employees and students in workplaces
and schools that did not offer or require FLE must have received FLE,
and that some employees in workplaces that offered FLE certainly did
not receive FLE, should drive their estimates of the effectiveness of FLE
downward.
However, although this methodology can eliminate self-selection
problems, it does not create true controls. Workplaces that offer financial
education and advice are not controlled settings in which employees are
otherwise exposed to the same conditions as employees in workplaces
not offering these services. States with financial education mandates
cannot be kept identical in all other relevant respects to states without
mandates. Given differing economic conditions across states and firms,
omitted variable bias is likely. In fact, recent work attempting to replicate
Bernheim, Garrett, and Maki’s study of the effect of state financial education
mandates, using a data set several orders of magnitude larger, found that
states imposed mandates at times when they were experiencing high
economic growth, and that increased savings and investment rates correlated
with economic growth, not with the imposition of state financial
education mandates.106
Nonexperimental designs cannot prove causality in the social sciences.107
Randomized experiments are not always possible, forcing researchers to
rely on observational or survey data. But comparisons between results of
nonexperimental and experimental research consistently demonstrate
103. Bernheim & Garrett, supra note 49, at 1493–94.
104. Id.
105. B. Douglas Bernheim et al., Education and Saving: The Long-Term Effects of
High School Financial Curriculum Mandates, 80 J. PUB. ECON. 435, 442 (2001).
106. Shawn Cole & Gauri Kartini Shastry, If You Are So Smart, Why Aren’t You
Rich? The Effects of Education, Financial Literacy and Cognitive Ability on Financial
Market Participation 20–21 (Nov. 2008) (draft paper, 2009 Federal Reserve System
Community Affairs Research Conference).
107. MITCHELL & JOLLEY, supra note 35, at 112.
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that findings from the former deviate—sometimes quite substantially—
from the latter. For example, a recent article compared the findings of
three different research designs used to determine the effect of get-outthe-vote phone calls on voter turnout. The randomized experiment found
no increase in voter turnout, whereas regression analysis and matching
estimation found a large and significant increase.108 Another article compared
experimental and nonexperimental analyses of the impact of, for example,
job training programs, and found that nonexperimental studies often
produced results that differed from experimental results by “policyrelevant margins.”109 As Caskey has argued, “[T]hese results alone
should raise doubts about the ability of non-experimental studies, even
when conducted in a very conscientious manner, to measure accurately
the impact of [financial] education.”110
Societal pressures and institutional review boards beyond the control
of researchers prevent most from engaging in randomized experiments
that could eliminate confounds and establish a proper control group for
comparison. Analyses of consumer education have long wrestled with
the problem that “program administrators find it socially unacceptable to
withhold an educational treatment from any individuals.”111 For example, if
a high school offers a personal finance course, educators are unlikely to
allow researchers to assign randomly one group of students to the
treatment group—meaning required to take the course—and another
group of students to the control group—meaning prohibited from taking
the course. For these reasons, it is extremely difficult to find naturally
occurring FLE settings that can be used to determine the efficacy of FLE.
The first wave of results from the one ongoing study that appeared
likely to surmount these research design barriers is discouraging. The
Federal Reserve Board conducted a multiyear study to determine the
effectiveness of FLE given to members of the armed services.112 The
military is in a unique position. In theory, it could randomly assign its
members to control and treatment groups, and mandate participation in
follow-up surveys so as to eliminate selection and nonresponse biases.
However, neither random assignment nor required participation in the
follow-up survey appears to have occurred in this study. Soldiers were
108. Kevin Arceneaux et al., Comparing Experimental and Matching Methods
Using a Large-Scale Voter Mobilization Experiment, 14 POL. ANALYSIS 37, 55 (2006).
109. Steven Glazerman et al., Nonexperimental Versus Experimental Estimates of
Earnings Impacts, 589 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 63, 63 (2003).
110. John P. Caskey, Can Personal Financial Management Education Promote
Asset Accumulation by the Poor? 5 (Ind. State Univ. Networks Fin. Inst., Policy Brief
No. 2006-PB-06, 2006).
111. Bloom & Ford, supra note 61.
112. Bernanke, supra note 16, at 8; Lynn Fox & Joy Hoffman, Federal Reserve
Personal Financial Education Initiatives, 2004 90 FED. RESERVE BULL. 447, 451 (2004).
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“offered” FLE rather than randomized into treatment and control groups,
and completing the follow-up was optional.113 The researchers obtained
follow-up data on less than 4% of the subjects in their treatment
group.114 Further, comparing the treatment group’s behaviors at the time
of the FLE and at follow-up is problematic because many became
married and gained some college education or a college degree between
the time of the FLE and their follow-up survey, and both of these might
cause a financial behavior change.115 Moreover, as explained above, at
follow-up some time after the course, the study found worse financial
behaviors among soldiers who received the FLE training than among
soldiers who did not participate in the FLE, controlling for other
variables affecting financial behavior.116
C. Measurement Issues
Recall the model of effective FLE:
Financial Education  Financial Literacy  Good Financial Decisions & Behavior

To empirically evaluate the model, researchers must employ measures
of the following: exposure to financial education, financial literacy
levels, and the quality of financial decisions and behavior. To validate
this particular model, they must demonstrate that any link between FLE
and improved behavior is moderated by increased literacy. But locating
reliable measures of each stage of the model and of the model overall
has proven challenging.
113. Bell et al., supra note 84 at 1, 3.
114. Id. at 3. The researchers do not report any statistics about subjects who did not
respond at follow-up, but the fact that more follow-up respondents were white and fewer
were black than the comparison group is a hint that the respondents and nonrespondents
differed. Id. at 4 tbl.1. The comparison group was not a randomized control group, and
comparison group members were a bit older with more military experience than the
members of the treatment group who responded to the follow-up survey. Id.
115. Id. Cole & Shastry, supra note 106, at 30, find that additional years of
education, but not mandated financial literacy education programs, increase retirement
savings and investment income.
116. Controlling for other variables, the researchers found that soldiers who took
the financial education course reported that they were less likely to use a formal budget
and more likely to use an informal budget than soldiers who did not take the course. Bell
et al., supra note 84, at 19 & tbl.16.
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1. Accuracy of Measures of Exposure to Financial
Literacy Education
As noted above, to avoid self-selection problems, Bernheim, Garrett,
and Maki used a proxy measure for exposure to FLE in their
investigation of the effect of high school financial education on adult
retirement savings.117 The proxy was whether the state in which the
respondent attended high school had a mandate requiring students to
receive instruction in personal finance at the time the respondent was in
high school.118 The authors found that residents schooled in states with
mandates had more retirement savings.119 Their proxy measure appears
to have some validity, in that adults who attended high school in “mandate”
states were more likely to report having attended a class that included
personal finance topics. However, only about half of those in “mandate”
states recalled taking such a course, and over a quarter of those in
“nonmandate” states recalled taking such a course. Further, state education
departments report that “mandates” can mean as few as 25 to 50% of
students are receiving FLE.120 These mandates thus do not appear to be a
particularly accurate measure of exposure to FLE.
Depending on the high school state distribution of respondents, the
misclassification of even a state or two could substantially undermine
the Bernheim, Garrett, and Maki results. As these researchers acknowledge,
there is conflicting evidence as to which states had mandates during the
relevant time period. Officials in New Mexico and Oklahoma, which
the authors classified in their analysis as “mandate” states,121 responded
to surveys conducted in 1985122 and 1990123 that they had no consumer
education mandates and that fewer than 25% of their students took such
a class by graduation.124 In the 1985 survey, officials in Pennsylvania,
which the authors classified as a “nonmandate” state, responded that
they had a consumer education mandate.125

Bernheim et al., supra note 105, at 436.
Id.
Id. at 462.
CHARLOTTE H. SCOTT, NAT’L COAL. OF CONSUMER EDUC., INC., 1990 NATIONAL
SURVEY: THE STATUS OF CONSUMER EDUCATION IN UNITED STATES SCHOOLS GRADES K–
12, at 64–65 (1990), http://eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/
0000019b/80/22/d3/8a.pdf.
121. Bernheim et al., supra note 105, at 440 tbl.1.
122. DENNIS C. BRENNAN, JOINT COUNCIL ON ECON. EDUC., A SURVEY OF STATE
M ANDATES FOR E CONOMICS I NSTRUCTION 1985–86, at 14–15 (1986), available at
http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/2
f/22/fa.pdf.
123. SCOTT, supra note 120, at 49.
124. Id. at 65.
125. BRENNAN, supra note 122, at 3, 16.
117.
118.
119.
120.
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Given that only 200 of the 1900 respondents in the study attended a
high school that the authors had designated as covered by a mandate,
results could be spurious, perhaps reflecting local economic conditions—
70% of respondents still lived in their high school state—rather than any
effect of FLE.126 Indeed, as set forth above, a recent study attempting to
replicate the Bernheim, Garrett, and Maki results using census data with
a sample size of 3.6 million households found that household savings
and investment income were correlated with state economic growth, and
not with the imposition of financial education mandates.127
A similar problem is at play in the research of Bernheim and Garrett
on workplace “education” and saving for retirement. As their measure
of exposure to education, the authors used self-reports as to whether the
respondent’s employer offered “seminars, professional assistance, or
informative materials to assist with retirement planning.”128 Even
accurate survey responses to this question would be a poor measure
of FLE because the question did not distinguish between seminars and
professional assistance. During the time period relevant to the question,
just over half of the employees offered workplace “education” were
eligible to attend seminars, and a slightly higher proportion were given
access to a financial planner or investment advice.129 Thus, although the
study is frequently cited as demonstrating that workplace FLE boosts
savings, the results might reflect the efficacy of professional retirement
planning assistance in boosting savings. This would not support the
model of FLE that its promoters have in mind.
2.

Validity of Measures of Financial Knowledge,
Skills, and Confidence

A number of studies are cited as evidence for the first causal link of
the model, between FLE and financial knowledge and skills. One
investigation, for example, found that taking a college course covering
personal finance topics increases a consumer’s score on the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) investment knowledge test by
three-quarters of a point out of ten possible points.130 However, the NASD
126. For further discussion of this study, see Caskey, supra note 110, at 9–10.
127. Cole & Shastry, supra note 106, at 16, 20–21.
128. Bernheim & Garrett, supra note 49, at 1493.
129. Id. at 1491.
130. Tzu-Chin Martina Peng et al., The Impact of Personal Finance Education Delivered
in High School and College Courses, 28 J. FAM. & ECON. ISSUES 265, 271, 277 (2007).
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test asks about basic facts—for example, whether “a reasonable average
annual return that can be expected from a broadly diversified US stock
mutual fund over the long run” is 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, or 25%.131 The
Jump$tart survey asks similar factual questions, in addition to questions
requiring simple addition, subtraction, and multiplication.132 Even the
questions that consumers find most challenging and are least likely to
answer correctly (for example, when interest rates fall, what should
happen to bond prices?, or, if you put $100 in an account bearing interest
at 20% per year and make no withdrawals, will you have more or less
than $200 at the end of five years?)133 are factual or require mathematical
calculations based on specified dollar figures, interest rates, and time
periods.
But the knowledge and skills evidenced by these tests are a far cry
from what consumers need to compare two adjustable rate mortgages or
calculate the amount that they should save for retirement—knowledge
and skills that the Federal Reserve and the Department of Labor implicitly
believe consumers should have. For low-wage sector consumers, the
literacy needed to score highly on these tests would not help them
establish and follow household budgets; the income side of these
consumers’ budget equations is too uncertain to be determined without
probability calculations based on forecasts of macroeconomic factors
that will affect their employers’ labor needs. Moreover, consumers who
answer “correctly” that the stock mutual fund annual return that can be
expected is 10% are not knowledgeable so much as impressionable; past
performance of the stock market cannot be used to predict future
performance over long horizons, and a consumer who calculates retirement
savings by assuming a 10% return is not engaging in good financial
behavior as some economists see it.134
As for the link between FLE and confidence, all research has
concluded that participants gain increased financial confidence after
taking a personal finance class. One report quotes a consumer who had
just completed the Financial Security in Later Life course: “‘It is
amazing how a few changes made me feel empowered. I made a “to do”
list and I am determined to get them all checked off.’”135 This is an
Id. at 283.
JUMP$TART COAL. FOR PERS. FIN. LITERACY, 2008 SURVEY OF PERSONAL
FINANCIAL LITERACY AMONG COLLEGE STUDENTS 1–6 (2008), http://www.jumpstart.
org/fileindex.cfm (follow “Download” hyperlink next to “2008 Survey of Personal
Financial Literacy Among High School Students”).
133. Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 54, at 6–7.
134. E.g., Zvi Bodie, An Analysis of Investment Advice to Retirement Plan
Participants, in THE PENSION CHALLENGE: RISK TRANSFERS AND RETIREMENT INCOME
SECURITY 19, 24 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Kent Smetters eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2003).
135. IMPACT REPORT, supra note 42.
131.
132.
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incomplete measure of the element of “confidence” in the FLE model,
however, because it could indicate overconfidence rather than appropriate
confidence. In one study, half of the respondents who reported that their
financial literacy was very high did not objectively test within the highest
quartile of the sample, and over 15% were in the bottom quartile.136 For
FLE to be effective, consumers’ confidence in the knowledge and skills
that they believe they have gained must be justified. To estimate whether a
personal finance course produced an improved degree of confidence,
empiricists would need to compare how well-calibrated consumers’ selfassessments of knowledge and skills were before and after participation
in FLE.
3.

Validity of Measures of Financial Behavior

Studies cited as evidence for the proposition that FLE improves
behavior use rough measures of behavior quality. Most commonly, this
research takes change in, or amount of, savings as its indicator of FLE’s
efficacy.137 Other measures used to assess the quality of financial
behavior derive from data in credit reports, such as number of credit
cards, late payments, bankruptcies, foreclosures, and credit score.138 For
studies of particular FLE programs, progress toward the goals of the
program is the measure by which researchers typically measure behavior
quality.139
However, these measures may not accurately reflect the quality of
financial behavior. What appears to be good financial behavior may be
caused by inertia rather than literacy. Savings and insurance may reflect
employer decisions about default or matching contribution rates. Credit
reports contain inaccuracies and incomplete information, and although
the majority of errors are inconsequential, the errors are not randomly
distributed but rather vary by consumer age and income and share of

136. Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 54, at 23 tbl.4.
137. E.g., Bernheim et al., supra note 105, at 462; Bernheim & Garrett, supra note
49, at 1488; Lusardi, supra note 91, at 157.
138. E.g., Elliehausen et al. II, supra note 63; Courchane & Zorn, supra note 16, at
3–5.
139. E.g., Braucher, supra note 38, at 562–63 (relying on the goal of the program—
to increase bankruptcy repayment plan completion rates—to assess a debtor education
program’s success); Hirad & Zorn, supra note 16 (relying on reductions in homeownership
delinquency rates to measure the quality of counseling programs that aimed to lower
mortgage delinquency rates).
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minorities in the consumer’s home census tract.140 Further, credit report
contents and resulting credit scores may not be good measures of behavior.
Credit scores discount excellent financial behaviors by individuals who pay
rent rather than a mortgage, place great weight on poor financial outcomes
that may not be a result of poor financial behavior, and reflect good
financial outcomes unrelated to literacy.141
Goals of some FLE programs, such as increasing savings, avoiding
bankruptcy, or reducing mortgage default, are not always financially
wise. Savings is not invariably the best use of money; investment in
education or job training, housing, or a business might generate higher
long-term returns. Declaring bankruptcy and getting a fresh start might
be optimal financial behavior for consumers who have lost their homes
or jobs in a natural disaster. Defaulting on an underwater mortgage—
meaning that the debt exceeds the market value of the house—can be
financially advantageous, depending, for example, on whether the
negative effect on the consumer’s credit report is smaller or greater than
the positive effect on her balance sheet from the divestment of the
debt.142
Further, because an individual’s financial well-being is determined by
meeting a web of interrelated goals and along many metrics, meeting
one goal or improving one metric may have little effect on a consumer’s
financial situation overall. If FLE increases savings, this will be of no
help in retirement if the money is poorly invested, diverted to crises
precipitated by underinsurance, or spent to meet subsequent credit payment
obligations.143 If FLE causes a reduction in late payments sufficient to
increase credit scores, this may reduce prices paid for insurance and
credit, but only if consumers understand different pricing structures for
insurance and credit products and shop for the best price.144

140. Michael E. Staten & Fred H. Cate, Accuracy in Credit Reporting, in BUILDING
ASSETS, BUILDING CREDIT: CREATING WEALTH IN LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES 237, 237
(Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2005); Robert B. Avery et al., Credit Report
Accuracy and Access to Credit, 90 FED. RESERVE BULL. 297, 318–19 (2004).
141. Staten & Cate, supra note 140, at 240; Avery et al., supra note 140, at 315.
142. E.g., Valentina Hartarska & Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, Credit Counseling and
Mortgage Termination by Low-Income Households, 30 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 227,
239 (2005). See also Ron Lieber, Thoughts on Walking Away from Your Home Loan,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/14/your-money/mortgages/
14money.html (discussing pros and cons of defaulting on an underwater mortgage).
143. ROBERT I. LERMAN & ELIZABETH BELL, THE URBAN INST., FINANCIAL LITERACY
STRATEGIES: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 1, 3–4 (2006), http://www.urban.org/
UploadedPDF/311352_financial_literacy.pdf.
144. Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem
of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 831 (2006).
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4. Completeness of Measures of the Financial
Literacy Education Model
Policymakers cite academic work as support for the entire FLE model,
although most work examines only one link, either between FLE and
literacy or between literacy and behavior. Tests of knowledge and skills
such as the Jump$tart survey can demonstrate changed literacy, but not
whether that literacy will change behavior. On the other hand, observations
of behavior change cannot demonstrate that changed financial literacy
was the moderator.
Investigations that look at both links falter if they measure the effect
of FLE on financial literacy separately from the effect of financial
literacy on financial behavior. For example, research that demonstrates
that economics training and workplace retirement education are associated
with increased literacy and that increased literacy is associated with
better financial behavior145 does not demonstrate causation from FLE to
literacy to behavior. Likewise, a finding that consumers on average
increased their financial knowledge and improved their reported
behaviors after participating in financial training146 does not show that
these consumers used gained knowledge to improve their financial
behavior.
Instead, a model in which financial literacy is the moderator between
FLE and financial behavior must be empirically validated. Courchane
and Zorn’s recent work is designed to test the entire model.147 If better
data were available, selection effects eliminated, and valid measures of
good financial behavior established, this design could form the basis for
more complete research designs in the future.
5. Barriers to the Development of Better Measures
Why have researchers used financial education, literacy, and behavior
measures of questionable validity? Demonstrating the effectiveness of
the FLE model requires valid measures of each of these, as well evidence
of causal links among them. But the FLE model is underspecified in both
technical and normative respects. We lack consensus as to both “what

145.
146.
147.

See, e.g., Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 54, at 16.
Wiener et al., supra note 36, at 347.
Courchane & Zorn, supra note 16, at 2.
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should be measured” and “how it should be measured.”148 As researchers at
the Federal Reserve have conceded, despite that agency’s own efforts to
promote FLE, “In analyzing the efficacy of financial literacy programs,
the primary challenge is defining and quantifying ‘success.’”149
We have consensus on general principles of good financial behavior:
where cost-effective, consumers should perform an adequate search for
information about alternatives; should expend the needed resources to
analyze those alternatives objectively; should base decisions on that
analysis by trading off incommensurate costs and benefits where needed;
should plan for the future and implement those plans through budgeting
where necessary; should select financial products that meet needs
without paying excessive prices or incurring excessive risk; should have
a personal financial safety net through insurance, precautionary savings,
or both; and once a safety net is established, should accept those risks
that present a positive probability of higher returns rather than only lowrisk, low-return alternatives.
But assessing whether a particular consumer has followed these
principles before and after receiving FLE would require us to operationalize
more concretely each of these principles. Here, measurement instruments
flounder because we have few benchmarks for evaluating financial
decisions and behavior.
First, we lack technical agreement about which financial decisions and
behaviors are good ones. Ask three different planning software programs
how much to save for retirement and they will give you three different
results.150 The common wisdom dispensed to consumers about investing
for retirement is that they should invest in stocks when young and
gradually shift to lower risk investments as they age, but respected
economists disagree.151 In 2004, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan
Greenspan publicly stated that consumers who took out fixed rate
mortgages were leaving money on the table,152 but today we know that
many consumers, and perhaps even the world economy, would be better
off if they had declined adjustable rate mortgages that they can no longer
afford.

148. Lyons et al., supra note 32, at 216.
149. Sandra Braunstein & Carolyn Welch, Financial Literacy: An Overview of
Practice, Research, and Policy, 88 FED. RESERVE BULL. 445, 449 (2002).
150. Damon Darlin, A Contrarian View: Save Less and Still Retire with Enough,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2007, at A1.
151. E.g., Bodie, supra note 134, at 20–22.
152. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys., Understanding
Household Debt Obligations, Remarks at the Credit Union National Association 2004
Governmental Affairs Conference (Feb. 23, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.federal
reserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/20040223).
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Second, because consumer circumstances vary, behaviors that are
welfare-enhancing for some are not for others. Consumers who are not
“in a financial position to maintain a healthy [bank] account” might be
better off without one.153 In addition to paying overdraft charges, these
consumers could suffer lowered credit scores that result in higher credit
and insurance costs over the long-term. For low-income families,
reducing current consumption to accumulate savings may do more harm
than good.154 Homeownership can also have a down side; it appears to
lead to poorer neighborhood conditions, on average, for low-income
consumers who were previously renters.155 Even a credit card over-thelimit fee does not necessarily reflect a poor decision. On financial
grounds alone, paying for medical treatment and incurring the fee might
be wiser than foregoing treatment and suffering health consequences that
reduce earning potential. These contextual factors mean that operationalized
measures used to evaluate FLE must vary with the circumstances.
Third and more fundamentally, we lack normative consensus about
the quality of financial decisions and behavior.156 If financial decisions
were just about money, if they were part of a game without real life
consequences, we could develop decision rules that maximize wealth.
But financial decisions do have consequences, requiring trade-offs
among costs and benefits that are valued very differently by different
consumers. Normatively, the decision to purchase anything from Neiman
Marcus might be poor. Normatively, paying for a daughter’s wedding
dress and incurring a credit card over-the-limit fee might be good. The
quality of any financial decision will depend on the values held by the
consumer and a host of other unobserved situational, psychological, and
social factors.

153. Angela C. Lyons & Erik Scherpf, Moving from Unbanked to Banked: Evidence
from the Money Smart Program, 13 FIN. SERV. REV. 215, 229 (2004).
154. John Karl Scholz & Ananth Seshadri, The Assets and Liabilities Held by LowIncome Families 28 (Oct. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available
at http://www.npc.umich.edu/news/events/access_assets_agenda/scholz_and_seshadri.pdf.
155. Shannon Van Zandt, Racial/Ethnic Differences in Housing Outcomes for FirstTime, Low-Income Home Buyers: Findings from a National Homeownership Education
Program, 18 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 431, 465 (2007).
156. Braucher, supra note 38, at 563. See generally Toni Williams, Empowerment
of Whom and for What? Financial Literacy Education and the New Regulation of
Consumer Financial Services, 29 LAW & POL’Y 226 (2007).
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D. Issues in the Interpretations of Results
1. “Findings” Suggestive of Bias
The ideological belief that FLE is effective runs so deep that even
well-respected researchers—or perhaps the editors who publish their
works—at times misinterpret null results from their own studies as
providing support for the FLE model.
For example, a NASD investigation found that elderly consumer fraud
victims were more financially literate, on average, than elderly nonvictims:
A major hypothesis going into the survey was that investment fraud victims do
not know as much about investing concepts as non-victims and would therefore
score lower on financial literacy questions. In fact, the study found the exact
opposite: investment fraud victims scored higher than non-victims on eight
financial literacy questions. Additionally, a subgroup of “likely active investors”
was created within the larger group of non-victims to determine if the difference
in financial literacy scores had to do with the number of active investors in the
non-victim group. The investment victims outscored even this subgroup of
likely active investors on the financial literacy questions.157

Perhaps the experience of being victimized led to increased knowledge
about investing. Perhaps preexisting knowledge led to overconfidence,
which led to victimization. Perhaps the personality characteristics that
lead some to seek and retain knowledge about investing also make them
prone to falling for investment fraud schemes. The causal mechanism is
unclear, so all one can deduce from the data is that literacy is correlated
with the incidence of fraud. Instead, the study asserts that “[t]his finding
suggests that financial literacy programs are necessary but probably not
sufficient to prevent fraud.”158
A study commissioned by the State of Washington to examine the
financial literacy of victims of predatory home lending shows the same
pattern, erroneously claiming that its data “strongly support[] the need
for an education program that teaches financial concepts to consumers.”159
The author tested consumers who had taken loans from a predatory home
lender—“victim” group—against a sample from the general population.160
Test results indicated that the former knew relatively more about home
mortgages but less about investments.161 The author concludes that the group
157. NAT’L ASS’N OF SEC. DEALERS, INVESTOR EDUC. FOUND., INVESTOR FRAUD
STUDY FINAL REPORT 5–6 (2006), http://sec.gov/news/press/extra/seniors/nasdfraud
study051206.pdf.
158. Id. at 6.
159. DANNA MOORE, WASH. STATE UNIV. SOC. & ECON. SCI. RESEARCH CTR.,
SURVEY OF FINANCIAL LITERACY IN WASHINGTON STATE: KNOWLEDGE, BEHAVIOR,
ATTITUDES, AND EXPERIENCES 15 (2003).
160. Id. at 6–7.
161. Id. at 25–26, 27 tbls.2 & 3.
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who had taken loans with the predatory lender had “lower financial
knowledge” and would benefit from a literacy program.162 The author
does not explain how increasing knowledge of investments would help
consumers avoid predatory lenders. More plausible explanations of the
data would be that either victims were made more vulnerable by their
knowledge, perhaps due to overconfidence, or victims became more
financially literate in the area of mortgages through their bad experiences.
The conclusion in an evaluation of the Money 2000™ program that its
“data lend support for the efficacy of financial literacy training in
promoting improved financial behaviors” is similarly unfounded.163 The
only behavior changes reported in the study are decreased debt for some
participants, increased savings for some, and increased debt for some.
Overall, the study reports that increased debt exceeded decreased debt.164
Increased debt could be a good financial behavior, depending on the
surrounding circumstances, but it could also be a poor financial behavior.
The data do not support the conclusion that FLE is effective.
2. Low Statistical Significance
Some findings cited as support for the FLE model lack statistical
significance at the 0.05 level. For example, preliminary results of
Courchane and Zorn’s work designed to test the entire FLE model suffer
from low statistical significance. Courchane and Zorn merged several
large data sets to test for links among FLE, financial knowledge and
confidence, financial behavior, and creditworthiness—the study’s financial
outcomes measure.165 Employing elaborate controls, these empiricists
determined that respondents who reported learning more from financial
seminars or classes—the study’s FLE measures—were relatively more
confident in their financial knowledge.166 But preliminary analysis of
the data did not demonstrate at the 0.05 level the relationships postulated
in the FLE model between education and knowledge or, given high
financial confidence, between various levels of financial knowledge and
financial behavior.167 Further, FLE through seminars did not have a

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 60–61.
Osteen et al., supra note 36, at 5.
Id.
Courchane & Zorn, supra note 16, at 2.
Id. at 11–13 tbl.9.
Id. at 15 tbl.10, 17–19 tbl.11.
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relationship to financial behavior demonstrable at the 0.05 level.168
Although the data indicated that better financial behavior was associated
with better outcomes, FLE had no direct relationship to outcomes at the
0.05 level.169
Admittedly, 5% is not some holy grail; “surely, God loves the .06
nearly as much as the .05.”170 But some of the results here were obtained at
the 0.12 to 0.99 level.171 Courchane and Zorn explain that their results
cannot reject the possibility that FLE is not effective—the null
hypothesis—at conventional confidence levels.172 But policymakers and
others who cite their results are not always so careful.173
3. Limited Value of Reported Positive Effects
A number of studies have reported positive effects that,
methodological issues aside, might have been caused by FLE. However,
these improvements have tended to be very small, suggesting that even
if FLE can work, it is not a cost-effective public policy.
Elliehausen, Lundquist, and Staten have presented evidence of a small
negative relationship between credit counseling, which they assert
involves an FLE component, and debt.174 For consumers in middle and
lower income groups, counseling was associated with a reduction in debt
between 2% and 12%, although at higher incomes, counseling was
associated with an increase in debt.175 However, although a 12% reduction
in debt for low-income consumers appears to be cause for celebration, it
is apparently not important enough to affect these consumers’ credit

168. Id. at 19 tbl.11.
169. Id. at 20–22 tbl.12, 27 tbl.13.
170. Ralph L. Rosnow & Robert Rosenthal, Statistical Procedures and the
Justification of Knowledge in Psychological Science, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1276, 1277
(1989).
171. E.g., Hirad & Zorn, supra note 16, at 173 tbl.5A-2; Courchane & Zorn, supra
note 16, at 15 tbl.10, 17–19 tbl.11, 22 tbl.12, 27 tbl.13.
172. Courchane & Zorn, supra note 16, at 2. Other research displays the same problem.
For example, Gartner and Todd’s research on web-based FLE based on VISA’s FLE
programs produced no statistically significant results. Gartner & Todd, supra note 16, at
9. Almost none of the military study’s bivariate results show statistically significant
differences for the group who received financial education between baseline prior to the
education and at follow-up some time later. Bell et al., supra note 84, at 7–14 tbls.3–12.
Although some differences between the group who received the education and the
comparison group were statistically significant at the 0.05 level, the difference cannot be
attributed to having received the education because the group who received the education
did not change from baseline prior to the course to follow-up after the course to any
significant degree. Id.
173. E.g., Bernanke, supra note 16, at 4; Martin, supra note 18, at 9, 20.
174. Elliehausen et al. II, supra note 63, at 18.
175. Id. at 20–22.
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scores; the authors found that counseling was associated with virtually
no increase in credit scores.176
Tennyson and Nguyen, after contacting state education officials to
confirm their state classifications, found improved financial literacy
when particular FLE coursework was mandated for high school
students.177 They divide data from the Jump$tart test of high school
seniors into results from states with no FLE curriculum mandates, states
with general mandates but no specific required course content, and the
three states that require students to take specific coursework in personal
finance.178 Controlling for other variables that they determined affect
scores, they saw no differences in scores between students in the first two
types of states, but that students in the states with specific coursework
mandates scored an average 2.3 points higher.179 Examining particular
questions, they found that these students scored no higher on the questions
about spending, debt, or money management, but outperformed students
in other states on questions about savings, investing, and income.180
Unfortunately, financial gains accrued through knowledge about savings,
investing, and income can be quickly lost through welfare-reducing
spending, debt, or money management decisions. Further, the gain in
scores associated with mandated personal finance coursework amounted
to a difference of less than one of the thirty-one questions on the test.181
On average, students who attended schools with financial coursework
mandates answered fewer than 60% of the questions correctly.182
Wiener and his colleagues assessed the effectiveness of a voluntary
program offered to consumers in bankruptcy in part by comparing the
financial literacy levels of debtors who received financial training,
debtors who did not, and nondebtors.183 All subjects were tested for
their financial knowledge using twelve identical questions before the
training date and three months later. The group that received training
was given course materials to bring home.184 It was also the only group

176. Id. at 25–27.
177. Sharon Tennyson & Chau Nguyen, State Curriculum Mandates and Student
Knowledge of Personal Finance, 35 J. CONSUMER AFF. 241, 259 (2001).
178. Id. at 245–46, 247 tbl.2.
179. Id. at 253.
180. Id. at 254.
181. Id. at 245, 253.
182. Id. at 249.
183. Wiener et al., supra note 36, at 352.
184. Id. at 350.
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to increase their average score at a statistically significant level.185 The
authors conclude that “[a]lthough the gains are modest, these data show
strong quasi-experimental evidence that the financial literacy training
program improves knowledge of appropriate saving, spending, and
credit use.”186
The score increase for trained debtors was 4%, equivalent to less than
half a question.187 Given that the response rate of trained debtors to the
post-test was 34% and of untrained debtors and nondebtors was 56% and
71% respectively,188 and that when self-administering the post-test some
of the trained debtors likely consulted their course materials, the 4%
increase in the average trained debtor’s score might not reflect even a
modest gain in financial literacy.
The American Dream Demonstration project is routinely cited for its
findings that “financial education has positive effects on savings and . . .
courses need not be long to take advantage of the potential benefits.”189
For “savers” who attended personal finance classes in this program, each
hour of FLE up to eight hours was associated with a statistically
significant average increase in monthly savings.190 Eight hours of education
may have added about $125 to annual savings of “savers” during the
program, in which the average participation lasted two years.191
However, these results are reported only for the 56% of participants
who had saved a net of at least $100 in the program.192 For these
“savers,” an additional $125 each year could create a buffer that would
help them cope with small financial shocks—missing a couple of days of
work. But many events that require consumers to dip into savings are
much more expensive. Further, the time spent in class and the increase
in annual savings had to come from somewhere, and so results must be
balanced against the reduction in hours available for work and in
monthly spending experienced by these low-income consumers.193 On
the whole, this FLE program may not have improved participant
financial welfare.

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
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4. Barriers to Better Interpretation of Results
Neither data nor financial support for FLE research is easy to come by.
FLE advocates want to spend every dollar on programs. Government
agencies have limited resources. This leaves many researchers dependent
on industry, which already collects a large amount of data about its
customers’ payment histories, retirement savings contributions and
investments, and other relevant statistics.
The financial services industry has no interest in discovering that FLE
is ineffective. These programs help industry promote goodwill, penetrate
new markets, cull out unqualified home loan applicants,194 and ideally,
increase retirement savings under their management. If FLE is not
effective, industry loses its most potent argument against regulation—
that consumers are better off making their own financial choices and that
impediments to good consumer financial decisionmaking are better
addressed through FLE. When industry is supplying the data, funding,
or both, it cannot help but have an effect on the publicized research. For
example, although Gartner and Todd’s experiment using VISA’s Practical
Money Skills for Life FLE program produced no statistically significant
results, and the results that were produced were likely driven by selfselection effects, 195 VISA claims on its website that the experiment
demonstrated that the program was an “effective medium of education
for this sample population” and does not explain either the lack of
statistical significance or the self-selection problem.196
None of the researchers hid their studies’ weaknesses. Most included
a substantial discussion of research limitations. But editors may obscure
these caveats. For example, one table of data on consumers’ intentions
to change their financial behavior is titled “Estimates of Changes in
Retirement Savings Behavior,”197 even though the authors made plain in
the text that few consumers followed up on their intentions.198 The “A

194. GEORGE W. MCCARTHY & ROBERTO G. QUERCIA, RESEARCH INST. FOR HOUS.
AM., BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN SUPPLY AND DEMAND: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
HOMEOWNERSHIP, EDUCATION AND COUNSELING INDUSTRY 8–9 (2000), http://www.
housingamerica.org/Publications/48506_BridgingtheGapBetweenSupplyandDemand.pdf.
195. Gartner & Todd, supra note 16, at 9.
196. Practical Money Skills for Life: Wells Fargo Case Study, http://www. Practical
moneyskills.com/english/resources/about/WF_case_study.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2009).
197. Clark et al., supra note 36 (emphasis added).
198. Id. at 62.
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Little Knowledge Is a Good Thing” title of the Hirad and Zorn
homeownership counseling study similarly may reflect a publisher’s
choice; as noted above, the authors neither tested participant knowledge
nor claimed participants gained any.199 Even without these sorts of
invitations, FLE advocates and policymakers tend to see what they want
to see in empirical work, and researchers have little ability to control
that.
IV. CONCLUSION
What degree of effectiveness should appropriately be claimed for the
current model of financial literacy education? As yet, none, and the
barriers to research that would soundly demonstrate effectiveness or
ineffectiveness may be insurmountable. But the conclusion is not that
we must accept or reject FLE on ideological grounds alone and move on.
Rather, we should search for alternative public policy models that
recognize what financial education might realistically achieve. At least
two such models are suggested by the studies critiqued above.
The first alternative policy model is suggested by Mandell’s
examination of self-reported thrift among high school students. Mandell
found that students who took financial classes did not improve their
scores on the Jump$tart exam but did report higher levels of thrift, and
so he too conjectures, assuming students self-report accurately, a causal
link between FLE and improved financial behavior unrelated to financial
literacy.200 Courchane and Zorn come to a similar conclusion.201
Likewise, although their reported finding that high school curriculum
mandates increased savings has now been shown to be almost certainly
incorrect,202 they too conjecture that FLE might change behavior not
through increased knowledge or skills, but through “increased comfort
with financial transactions and concepts.”203
These academics present an intriguing possibility that it is not
financial literacy, but a norm or rule of thumb of thrift that mediates
between FLE and savings rates. Rather than providing support for the
current FLE model, these results suggest an alternative model of norms
training leading to changed behaviors. Financial norms education (FNE)
would encounter the same challenges in developing appropriate norms
that FLE faces in developing appropriate measures of good financial
199. Hirad & Zorn, supra note 16.
200. Mandell, supra note 47, at 7.
201. Courchane & Zorn, supra note 16, at 30.
202. See discussion of the findings of Cole & Shastry, supra note 106 and
accompanying text.
203. Bernheim et al., supra note 105, at 450.
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behavior—technical disagreement, appropriateness varying with context,
and normative disagreement. But FNE would be forced to address these
head on in establishing the norms to be taught. Wiener and his colleagues,
among others, have been developing a financial education program that
explicitly seeks to change participants’ attitudes or norms.204 These sorts
of programs should be developed and examined further.
For decisions and behavior that do not require a high degree of
financial literacy, financial norms training could be effective.205 But
adopting a norm can benefit consumers only when they can determine
how to apply the norm to the context at hand. Sometimes this will be
easy—a norm of not investing a 401(k) in an employer’s stock is one
that most consumers, if they have access to a 401(k), might follow.206
But knowing a rule of thumb to “diversify assets” in which that 401(k) is
invested is not enough if a consumer does not understand the basics
about how assets differ. Further, once a consumer decides how much to
allocate to a mutual fund class, a norm of comparison price shopping
will not be enough for her to determine which fund within the class has
the lowest fees and expenses.
These and other demands placed on consumers by society and the
marketplace today require more than knowledge of and motivation to
follow financial norms. Thus, a norms model of financial education
could be effective in improving consumer welfare only in conjunction
with a reduction in the complexity of the consumer financial decisions
and actions our society and marketplace require. Such simplification
would inevitably require substantive legal regulation of consumer
financial products. The variety, complexity, and sheer number of products
available in the marketplace would need to be reduced. Then, once
finance products were structured with only a few moving parts, consumers
might be able to apply rules of thumb learned in financial education
classes correctly, and the quality of their decisions might rise.

204. Wiener et al., supra note 36, at 350.
205. See Josh Wiener & Tabitha Doescher, A Framework for Promoting Retirement
Savings, 42 J. CONSUMER AFF. 137, 146–50 (2008) (explaining ways in which norms can
be harnessed to increase savings rates).
206. On the other hand, results thus far regarding financial education given to
soldiers found that even teaching the soldiers the simple lesson not to take out payday
loans or use pawn shops did not lead them to uniformly cease to do so, and once controls
were added to the study, the financial training had no effect on the incidence of these
poor financial practices among those who attended the training. Bell at al., supra note
84, at 14 tbl.12.
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The second public policy model suggested by the research above
stems from the studies of credit, retirement, and homeowner counseling.
It is plausible that intervention by a counselor and individualized
financial advice could improve consumer financial welfare. This raises
the possibility that rather than education, a better public policy response
to consumer finance problems might be to support pro bono expert
financial advisors. Consumers would need sufficient education to select
trustworthy and qualified advisors, but they would not need to perform
difficult calculations, judge the value of information sources, or perform
economic forecasting themselves.
Providing pro bono financial advice and enforcing quality and
integrity standards on the advisors would be costly to taxpayers. But
poor financial decisions by consumers and firms can also be costly to
taxpayers—witness the cost to cities of cleaning up neighborhoods hit
hard by mortgage foreclosures, the cost of emergency room medical care
provided to those without adequate health insurance, and the cost to
countries worldwide of the current financial crisis.
The two proposals dovetail in some respects. FNE might inculcate a
norm of skepticism about claims made by sellers of financial products
by explaining common scams and sellers’ financial incentives to steer
consumers to products that generate the most revenue for the seller.
Many “consumer rights” education programs include this in their curricula
already, as do some debtor education programs. A skepticism norm might
be sufficient for simple financial matters, but for complex decisions,
skepticism standing alone could lead to consumer fear without a way of
distinguishing between scams and good financial products. In turn,
skepticism about the market’s offerings could lead consumers to seek
out financial advisors for assistance. Provided that these advisors are
trustworthy, qualified, and affordable, the best FNE might espouse a
norm of relying on these advisors when making important financial
decisions.
These policies and others should be tried and tested. But until and
unless stronger evidence emerges that the current model of financial
literacy education is effective, policymakers and regulators should be
circumspect in their use of it as a response to consumer financial problems.
Researchers should be particularly cautious in the presentation of their
findings, so that academic work will contribute to the public policy
discussion empirical, rather than ideological, assessments of financial
literacy education.
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